Abstract-In this paper we introduce a probabilistic time-series model that quantifies the impact of inter-dependent natural, technical and human risk sources on energy supply continuity.
INTRODUCTION
The continuity of energy supplies depends on the performance of a complex supply chain which spans different countries and continents and is subject to a variety of interdependent human, technical and natural risk sources that may cause interruptions at different places within the supply chain. In the electricity sector this is further complicated by the high inelasticity of demand and the non-storability of supplies, which leads to a complicated system behavior.
Nevertheless, the models that are used for quantifying the continuity of commodity supplies are often surprisingly simple. Important reasons for simplicity are a reluctance to quantify uncertain risks such as political disruption probabilities, the desire to avoid intransparent modeling assumptions and the large cost involved with building and maintaining complicated models. Most probabilistic time series models therefore represent at least some of the intermediate variables in the calculation process by their average values instead of modeling them as stochastic variables, which may lead to errors in the estimation. Most alternative approaches which are used in particular for the quantification of political risk tend to further reduce or completely omit details about other, better known risk sources such as technical failure.
In this paper we will introduce a modeling framework which allows the detailed representation of the combined impact of natural, technical and human risk sources on the security of supplies within a single, probabilistic simulation. We will apply our model to a case study of the Italian gas and electricity supplies. The framing of the case study and our
Research has been funded by the EPSRC Grant EP/E0401lXlI as a part of the Supergen Flexnet Consortium. model are presented in sections II and III. In sections IV and IV we will explore the magnitude of error that is caused by typical simplifications in probabilistic time-series models and other, more simple heuristics. In section VI we summarize our conclusions.
II. FRAMING OF THE CASE-STUDY

A. Definition of energy security
The defmition of energy security that we use in our case study is the "continuity of commodity supplies relative to demand " . A detailed overview of alternative definitions can be found in [1] .
Discontinuities of the supply relative to demand can lead to a disruption of both the quantity that is delivered and the price at which energy is delivered. Either of these discontinuities can be measured with different metrics.
The continuity of supply quantities is usually the focus of technical reliability analyses. Two measures that are widely used in this context are the Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) -which is the cumulative probability of load shedding due to a negative reserve margin -and the Loss of Energy Expectancy (LOEE) -which is integral between amount of energy that is shed at each reserve margin and the probability of having such a reserve margin. Other common metrics can be found in [2] , [3] .
The continuity of prices in addition to supply quantities is usually the focus of economic cost-benefit analyses. Two metrics which are used in this context are the levelized cost to society (LCS) in £/MWh -which is the integral between the sum of fixed and variable production costs at each reserve margin and the probability of having such a reserve margin, divided by the total consumption -and the levelized cost to consumers (LCC) in £/MWh -which is the integral between the total cost to consumers at each reserve margin and the probability of having such a reserve margin, divided by the total consumption. Both of these economic metrics are illustrated in Fig. I Figure I . Illustration of economic continuity measures.
In our paper we separately report the above technical and economic continuity metrics for each commodity market. If desired, a composite indicator could be calculated by using the weighted sum of discontinuities in individual markets at the expense of losing information about the location of discontinuities.
Policy decision
In our case study we investigate the continuity of Italian gas and electricity supplies based on the DGTren Reference Scenario for Italy in 2030 [4] but replacing the 12.4GW nuclear capacity from the reference scenario with the same amount of concentrated solar power imports from Algeria. The decision which policy makers face is whether this infrastructure scenario (11) would be safe, or whether it would be warranted to introduce an additional strategic back-up for these imports. To answer this question, we investigate two alternative infrastructure scenarios with 12.4GW strategic reserve in addition to the solar imports from Algeria.
In the fIrst case, in scenario 12, the strategic reserve is provided by back-up gas generators -which are available for unlimited time, but only as long as there are enough gas supplies. In the second case, in scenario 13, the strategic reserve is provided by pumped storage hydro plants -which are also available in case of gas disruptions, but only for a limited time. The relative efficiency of these interventions depends on the frequency, the timing and the duration of gas and electricity disruptions as well as the cost levels. In the rest of this paper, we will compare how well the different modeling approaches can help to answer the question about which -if any -of these interventions would be appropriate.
In this section we will describe a stylised, probabilistic model of the energy system, which quantifies the joint impact of natural, technical and political risk on the continuity of gas and electricity supplies. The model thus combines elements from technical reliability analysis with those that are typical in the analysis of critical infrastructures. Within the model we assume that stochastic variables have a distribution which is from a standard family of probability density functions -such as an exponential distribution for outage probabilities or a lognormal distribution for price inputs, which is a common approach. A previous version of this model, which excludes the analysis of interdependencies between the risk sources, has been applied in a joint publication [5] .
A. Literature review
Models in technical reliability analysis typically tend to focus on a simulation of stochastic outages within a single fuel network. The two most commonly used approaches for this purpose are the analytical solution of Markov-Chain models and Monte Carlo Simulations [3] . In case of independent outages, analytical solutions of Markov-Chain models may be calculated using a stepwise, modular procedure as described in [6] . However, in case of interdependency between contingencies, a decomposition of the problem is not possible, and since the multi-variate state space grows exponentially, the analytical approach quickly reaches its limits. In the past this has not been a problem, as reliability analyses used to focus on independent technical failures. However, the push towards smarter grids and introduction of renewable energies lead to an increasing interconnection between networks and correlated local weather conditions.
In the area of critical infrastructure protection, this challenge has been recognized and is addressed in a variety of different models for interconnected infrastructure systems and multiple risk sources [7] . Interdependencies that are analyzed can be created by physical flows, geo-spacial co-location, policy or high level decisions and information flows [8] , [9] . Due to the complexity and size of a system of systems model, the 'vertical' models which integrate different networks and risk sources tend to use a much less detailed representation of individual networks than the 'horizontal' models for the technical reliability of individual networks that are used in control rooms [10] .
What is new in our model is the combination of features from both strands of literature by using a Monte-Carlo simulation at the same time as modeling structural dependencies between gas and electricity networks. In addition to this, our model addresses the uncertainty around input parameters which allow us to include highly uncertain political risk parameters by representing them as Bayesian variables with a broad distribution.
B. Model structure and variables
In our case study we follow the typical approach in critical infrastructure protection and model the Italian gas and electricity system as a directional graph [10] . Each node of the graph corresponds to the market of a specifIc energy form in a particular region. Each of the edges in the graph corresponds to an element of the energy infrastructure, which is linking two markets. The three main functions of the energy infrastructure are to transport, store and convert different forms of energy or energy services. Energy transportation infrastructure such as power-cables, pipelines and ships can be seen as links between the markets for the same fuel in different regions. Electricity transmission lines, which allow flows in both directions, are represented as two links between the same nodes in opposing directions. Energy storage infrastructure such as gas storage terminals and hydro reservoirs can be seen as links connecting the market from which they originate with itself across time. Energy conversion infrastructure, such as power plants and refineries can be seen as links between the markets for different energy forms in the same region. Demand for gas and electricity is modelled as an exogenous variable, which converts electricity or gas into consumer welfare. The regional resolution of our model is on a country level, which excludes the analysis of network constraints within a country. Each time step within our model corresponds to a single day. In order to estimate the impact of diurnal demand variations we use a fixed daily load-duration curve. All other variables are assumed to remain constant throughout the day. As a result of these strong simplifications which are largely driven by data constraints -the results of our model can only provide qualitative insights at this point. Each of the infrastructure links is characterised by a set of constant parameters, and a set of state dependent, variable parameters which are shown in Table I and  Table II . As we will see in the next section, the distinction between natural, technical and political risk is based on the dependency structure within the model: natural availability IS a deterministic function of weather variables, technical availability IS a random variable conditional on the weather state, and intentional political risk is a random variable that depends on the damage that is caused.
C. Calculation steps, treatment of uncertainty and dependencies
In this section we will describe the philosophy of treating uncertainty as well as the interdependency structure that is underlying our model by following the sequence of calculation steps that are repeated in each simulation run.
At step i of the calculation process, we draw the value for each of the uncertain parameters that are displayed in Table III from their Bayesian distribution. In step 2 of the calculation process, we calculate the natural availability aNat/ of each link i at each time step t as a function of the exogenously given time series of weather variables (wi; ... wK,) to which the link is exposed.
In step 3 of the calculation process we calculate the weather dependent technical forced outage and repair rate FOR. T/ and RR. T/ of each link i at each time step t as a function of the exogenously given time series of weather variables (wi; ... wK;) to which the link is exposed.
In step 4 of the calculation process we calculate the technical availability aTec/ of each link i at each time step t by simulating a random outage with probability FOP. T/ for every link that was technically available at time step t-l and a random repair with probability RP. T/ for every link that was unavailable for technical reasons at time t-l.
In step 5 of the calculation process we calculate the state dependent political forced outage and repair rate FOR. P/ and RR.P/ of each link i at each time step t as a function of the reserve margin at the output node of the link (wi; ... wK,) at time t. In step 6 of the calculation process we calculate the political availability aPol/ of each link i at each time step t by simulating a random outage with probability FOP. P/ for every link that was politically available at time step t -1 and a random repair with probability RP. p/ for every link that was unavailable for political reasons at time t-l.
In step 7 of the calculation process we fmally determine the system dispatch and the flows in and out of each linkl (jIn, ' , fOut, ' ) during time period t as a function of the natural, technical and human availability (aNat, ' , a Tec, ' and aPol, ' ) of each link i at time t. In the current model we assume a simplified deterministic dispatch plan. Due to the difficulty of re connecting gas consumers after a disruption, we assume that gas consumption is satisfied first and only the residual gas capacity is available for power production. The gas storage foUows the historical withdrawal pattern in [II], independently of the scarcity level. As long as the strategic hydro storage is not empty is used, up to its maximum output capacity, to satisfY any electricity demand that could not otherwise be met and as long as it is not fuU, it is recharged, up to its maximum input capacity whenever spare electricity generation capacity is available. The remaining plants are dispatched economicalJy on the basis of the merit order of short -run marginal cost. An overview of the calculation process and the resulting dependency structure is shown in Fig.2 . The dependencies between variables are important because as a result of the flaw of averages [12] in case of a non-linear dependency the average value of the dependent variable is likely to be different from the value that results from the mean of the independent variable.
1 In our example, links that connect different markets have zero storage capacity so that lOut = fIn *lJlnOut; .
Storage links connect back to the same market, so that either fln=O or fOut=O. We can therefore simplify by using only one flow variable f=fln + fOut, which is positive -in case of supply -and negative -in case of demand.
IV. RESULTS
MODELS FOR SIMPLIFIED PROBABILISTIC
Most energy market simulations typicaUy neglect dependencies by using average values at one or several steps of the calculation process described in Fig.2 . In order to explore the impact of successively alJowing for variability at different steps of the calculation process, we calculate the results for a number of different versions of our probabilistic model that are described in Table IV . Step4: aTec random variable, and Stochastic
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In Figure 3 .
and Fig.4 we show the impact of an increasing variability in model versions MI to Mil on the average value of the economic continuity metrics for each of the infrastructure scenarios I I to 13. Based on these graphs we draw three main conclusions.
First, in our case study, independent of the model version the lowest LCS is achieved by infrastructure scenario 13. The back-ups for solar power imports in 12 and 11 would therefore not be cost efficient.
Second, the choice of the modeling detail matters. If the fIxed cost of the additional hydro storage in 13 was lower, which would shift the LCS line for 13 closer to the x-Axis, the lines for 13 and 11 would intersect, so that the choice between infrastructure scenarios 13 and 11 would depend on the model version. A simplifIed model, such as Ml would then bias the decision in favor of the less reliable infrastructure in 11.
And third, not aU variations are equaUy important. V.
RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In an attempt to avoid the probabilistic simulation of highly uncertain events such as political supply disruptions, authors have suggested a number of alternative, simplifIed modeling approaches.
A. Indicators:
Indicators are the least detailed method and at the same time -partly because of their simplicity -one of the most popular approaches. The most popular indicators are concentration measures such as the Herfmdahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and the Shannon-Weiner-Index (SWI). In Error! Reference source not found. (1)
According to both concentration measures the preferred infrastructure scenario is 13, followed by 11 and then 12 which is different from the ranking according to the LCS or any other continuity measure of the probabilistic models. Portfolio theory provides a link between concentration measures and measures of the continu ity of supply quantities or prices. The great advantage of portfolio theory is the easy calculation of optimal portfolios and the intuitive explanation of the rationale of diversification. However, if realistic networks, extreme events and storage shall be assessed, the assumptions of unconstrained transmission, homogenous correlation [J4} and the neglection of the time-dimension will lead to wrong results. We have illustrated this in Table VI , where we calculate the levelized cost in the electricity market on the basis of the probabilistic model MIl, and use the average, standard deviation and correlations between the levelized cost of individual power plants that were calculated by this model during the simulations for infrastructure scenario 11 in order to estimate the LCS in 11, 12 and 13 using portfolio theory. in the same way as for the NPV in [15] . The levelized cost of the portfolio P containing N infrastructure links i (expected levelized cost in infrastructure scenario 11: E[LCSd) in proportion Xi was calculated as: We can see that ill our example PFT results ill the same ranking as the probabilistic model version MIL But PFT leads to a strong over-estimation of cost, as it does not take into account the reduction of levelized cost due to higher load factors of reserve plant (in 12) or the strategic storage (in 13). PFT thus provides a very inaccurate picture of what would happen if new infrastructure was built, or the existing links were interrupted.
C. Scenarios and break even frequencies:
Scenarios allow a very detailed analysis of the system behaviour in a particular situation. The scenarios can well be described in the form of a story, which makes them very useful for the communication of the selected risks. Even though the probabilities for scenarios may not be known, a policy measure will only be efficient for a specific range of probabilities.
In case of a single policy measure, the probability range can be represented using break-even frequencies {J6}. However, if the number of disruption scenarios and policy alternatives grows, the decision between them using break even frequencies can quickly become in tractable. We illustrate this in Fig.5 by showing the break-even frequencies for the different disruption scenarios of gas and electricity supplies from Algeria that are described in Table VII . With our current parameters, all the break even frequencies are lower than 5 years. This will probably be seen as implausible. However, the ranking between 12 and 13 is less clear. If the cost of the back-up plants in 12 and 13 was 75% lower, which would increase the break even frequencies by a factor four, the choice between 11, 12 and 13 is not obvious.
(LOEE) and the levelized cost society (LCS). These metrics using probabilistic time-series decision makers' beliefs about to consumers (LCC) or can be quantified by models to propagate the uncertain likelihood of different disruptions in a consistent manner and enrich it with detailed information about the technical operation of the system. In practice, most probabilistic models use approximations in the form of average values at one or several steps of the calculation process. This may bias decisions in favor of less secure policy options, as the likelihood of costly outages is reduced by the averaging.
As an alternative to probabilistic models, other approaches such as indicators, portfolio theory, scenario analyses or break-even frequencies have been suggested. We find that while indicators and portfolio theory lead to a large bias. Scenario approaches and break even frequencies on the other hand offer limited help if decisions depend on a number of different probabilities. A fully probabilistic approach may thus be an uncomfortable necessity in cases where the right policy choice is not obvious from scenarios and break-even frequencies. The largest difficulty for the measurement of energy security is probably the amount of resources that are required to gather the data, build and run such a model that includes all the known risks and interdependencies at reasonable level of detail and precision.
